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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Hon. Malcolm R. Wilkey */
I. Administrative Agencies in the United States
In drafting the Constitution, the Framers attempt-
ed to prevent the abuse of state power by apportioning it
among three branches of government. The emergence of
administrative agencies presents an embarrassing variation
to the separation of powers that was the genius of the
original constitutional plan, because, in a single organi-
zational entity, the capacity to legislate rules, to imple-
ment those rules, and to penalize individuals who do not
follow those rules may be combined.
To guard against the dangers inherent in this
admixture of functions, each of the three traditional
branches of government has developed mechanisms to restrain
the "fourth branch". The tripartite functions of
administrative agencies are thus subjected to tripartite
controls. For example, the legislature can limit agency
activity by appropriate language in the authorizing statute,
and by monitoring agency performance in appropriation and
oversight hearings. The executive branch can exercise the
supervisory power commanded by a bureaucratic superior, at
least over agencies that are not "independent," and even
over independent agencies there is executive budget control.
Finally, the judiciary can review agency decision making to
ensure conscientious consideration of the issues within the
authority of the agency, and a modicum of logical quality in
the ultimate decision.
This paper focuses on the aspirations, the mechan-
ics, and the practical limits to the third--the judicial--
check on administrative action. My reason for discussing
this subject with a British audience was well expressed by
David Williams, President of Wolfson College, Cambridge,
*/ U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
ThIs article first appeared in Justice for a Generation
(West Publishing Co., 1985), a collection of papers pre-
sented at the 1985 meeting of the American Bar Associa-
tion, London Sessions. It is reprinted here by permis-
sion.
when he referred to the 1957 report of your Franks Committee
to point out the benefits of international cross-
fertilization of ideas: Although "translation of the
[administrative] practice of one country into the procedures
of another is not likely to be appropriate, . . . since the
basic issue, the relationship between the individual and the
administration, is common, there will continue to be advan-
tage in comparative study". 1/
II. The Aim of Judicial Review
The purpose of judicial review is to uphold the
rule of law so that the aggregated and tripartite powers of
an agency are not subject to abuse. Admittedly, agency per-
sonnel have discretion in choosing how to carry out their
assigned tasks; some freedom of action is essential if the
agency is to perform its duties in a way that best achieves
the goals Congress set out when it established the agency in
the first place. Yet the purview of agency expertise is
limited by statutes and by constitutional requirements of
due process.
The trick to judicial review, then, is to super-
vise agencies closely enough to make sure that they are
doing their job but not so closely that courts do the
agencies' job for them. In the United States, courts have
gone much further than the requirements of British (and even
Canadian) notions of "natural justice" and the limited duty
to give reasons, and have required agencies to state their
factual findings and to reason to defensible conclusions.
The requirement of findings and conclusions serves two pur-
poses, one procedural and one substantive. From a proce-
dural standpoint, the requirement ensures that agencies
evaluate the available evidence, apply the governing law,
and think their way to a conclusion. From a substantive
standpoint, findings and conclusions provide a basis for
meaningful judicial review.
Because the objective of judicial review is to get
the agencies to do their jobs, a reviewing court will not
infer findings or supply a rationale not employed and cited
by the agency. If it were otherwise, courts would invade
1/ Williams, The Donoughmore Report in Retrospect, 60 Pub.
Admin. 273, 284 (1982).
the sphere reserved by Congress for the agency and would
depart from the sphere of their own expertise.
An analysis of judicial review produces a "summing
up" of all the rules of administrative law, both procedural
and substantive, for if an agency violates any of the funda-
mental rules, the agency action is sure to be challenged and
ultimately nullified by the courts.
III. Standards of Review by Type of Agency Action
Under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,
courts evaluate agency decision making under two general
rubrics. Review of informal rule making is governed by the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard, while review of agency
adjudication and formal rule making is governed by the "sub-
stantial evidence" standard of review. Under the latter
standard, the agency must compile a paper record, and its
conclusions must be supported on consideration of the record
as a whole, including the evidence against the agency's po-
sition as well as that in support. "Substantial evidence
review" thus holds the agency to a stricter standard of per-
formance.
Notwithstanding the superficially equal treatment
of all informal rule makings on the one hand, and all
adjudications and formal rule makings on the other hand,
precedents pertaining to one agency or function are not
necessarily transferable to another. In practice, courts
apply variable values and standards to different agencies,
even to different functions in the same agency. The reason
for this is that agencies perform at least six different
functions, each of which merits more or less deference to
agency expertise, subjects individuals and businesses to
more or less risk of arbitrariness, and is more or less
susceptible to judicial review after the fact. A court will
review activity within each function with the purpose of
that function in mind.
The functions may be isolated as follows:
(1) simple enforcement calling for sanctions, [e.g., orders
issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC)]; (2) rate making and
licensing (e.g., that performed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)];
(3) environmental and safety regulation, [e.g., rules
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)];
(4) the granting of benefits, loans, grants, and subsidies
by such agencies as the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS), the Department of Housing and Urban Development(HUD) , and the Veterans Administration (VA); (5) the in-
specting, auditing, and certification of potentially danger-
ous facilities and equipment performed by agencies like the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA); and (6) policymaking and planning such
as that undertaken by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the
NRC, and HHS. 2/
IV. How the Court Goes About It: The Method of Evaluating
Agency Action
In spite of the different functions reviewed, our
procedure is--or should be--a four-step analytic process.
Although thousands of pages have been written about it, the
essence of judicial review can be distilled into four simple
stages:
1. Was the action taken within the agency's
powers under its authorizing statute?
2. Were the parties accorded procedural due
process, that is, notice, followed by an appropriate
opportunity either to comment or to participate in a
hearing?
3. Was there evidence (substantial evidence in
an adjudicatory proceeding or formal rule making on the
record) to support the agency's action?
4. Was the rationale by which the agency reached
its results logical; in other words, was there a con-
nection between the evidence adduced and the conclusion
reached by the agency that is both discernible and de-
fensible?
Understand these four steps, and you understand judicial
review.
In reviewing an agency's decision for authority,
procedural due process, evidentiary support, and cogent
2/ Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative
Procedure, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 258, 294-303 (1978).
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reasoning, a court should not substitute its view for the
agency's judgment, even if, as is not uncommon, there is
substantial evidence to support either of two inconsistent
conclusions. Judicial restraint should be the order of the
day. As we put this standard in more than one case, "while
we may not have reached the same conclusion the Commissioner
did if we were to decide the matter ourselves, there need be
only a rational nexus between the facts found and the deci-
sion made to sustain the agency's determination".
My formulation of the appropriate inquiry is, I
submit, simpler to execute and less intrusive than that of
some of my colleagues on the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals. I am inclined to agree with Jack Beatson, Fellow
and Tutor in Law of Merton College, Oxford:
[TIhe dispute between members of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals . . . revolved
around the question of whether judges determine
the rationality of a decision by "steeping" them-
selves in the technology or by requiring more and
more elaborate procedures. Neither approach seems
particularly palatable. The first deprives the
agency of a substantial role in the decision on
the merits, while the second invites the high
costs of delay and the distortion of issues as
well as indirect interference with the determina-
tion of the merits of the case. 3/
The wisdom of judicial restrain becomes evident when we see
how judicial review works out in practice.
V. Current Specific Issues
Deregulation
President Reagan took office in January 1981, with
the idea that we could no longer look to government as the
solution to our problems; in many instances government was
the problem. Accordingly, in the truck, railroad, and
airline transportation industries, agency rate making and
regulation is being scaled back drastically (or eliminated
entirely, in the case of domestic airlines).
3/ Beatson, A British View of Vermont Yankee, 55 Tul. L.
Rev. 435, 446(4).
The President's deregulatory initiatives have led
to some interesting paradoxes. In the case of the Civil
Aeronautics Board, for instance, more administrative effort
has been expended trying to phase out the agency than was
found necessary to install it originally. Moreover, it is
surprising to observe who are among the most vehement op-
ponents of deregulation: those who prefer not to feel, but
to view from a sheltered industry the cold winds of competi-
tion elsewhere.
Some of these opponents have successfully sought
the aid of courts to block rescission of previously adopted
regulations. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the Supreme
Court held that the National Highway Safety Administration's
attempt to rescind a regulation mandating passive restraints
in automobiles was subject to the same standard of review as
would be applied to a regulation to require such restraints
in the first place. The court in State Farm vacated the
judgment of a panel of our court and instructed us in turn
to remand to the agency for further proceedings. In Public
Citizen and Center for Auto Safety, at the behest of a pub-
lic interest (not industry) group, a similarly constituted
panel of our court held that the same agency's suspension of
a tire treadwear grading standard was "arbitrary and capri-
cious" and went so far so to reinstate the standard.
While litigants in the two cases just mentioned
sought judicial review to block agency attempts to reduce
the burden of regulations, other litigants have invoked the
jurisdiction of our courts to compel agencies to embark on
regulatory campaigns. Environmentalists, for example, sued
the Interior Department under Secretary Watt and the
Environmental Protection Agency under Commissioner Gorsuch,
demanding the exercise of enforcement discretion to their
liking. But perhaps the most controversial example of this
stratagem is Chaney v. Heckler, in which a divided panel of
our court held that the administration of drugs in lethal
quantities to execute condemned prisoners violated the
"misbranding" and "safety and effectiveness" provisions of
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The plaintiffs apparently
wanted a label similar to that required on cigarette
packages--"The Surgeon General has determined that this drug
may be dangerous to your health". Not surprisingly, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and will hear argument this
coming term. [Ed. note--The Supreme Court has since
overruled.]
The Breakup of AT&T and Judicial Review of Consent Decrees
Perhaps the most widely publicized "deregulatory"
act in recent memory was the government's entry into a
consent decree with American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T),
which removed restrictions imposed on AT&T by a previous
consent decree. The earlier consent decree essentially
limited AT&T to the provision of common-carrier communica-
tions services.
In exchange for the right to enter the fast-
growing information and data-processing fields, AT&T agreed
to divest its local telephone operating companies. As a
result, there is now a new competitive situation, interna-
tionally, nationally, and regionally, as giant AT&T attempts
to compete against discount long distance carriers and to
establish a bridgehead in the market for microcomputers.
Regulatory adjustments will spawn new controversies with new
antagonists, and with old antagonists in new positions.
The AT&T breakup revives troubling questions about
judicial review of consent decrees. Ordinarily, extra-
judicial settlements of outstanding litigation are a welcome
alternative to an expensive and lengthy trial, but when one
of the parties is the United States, the possibility of
unilateral executive lawmaking is raised. For example, an
industry or public interest group may sue, reach agreement
with a regulatory agency, and persuade a court to enter a
consent decree settling the suit. The decree may be binding
on the agency forever, govern all other parties positioned
to raise similar issues, and severely constrict agency
discretion granted by statute. If courts do not engage in a
searching review of these consent decrees, "sweetheart
deals" between a sympathetic administration and a public
interest group or corporation may take place, as apparently
happened in the early 1950's with AT&T, and in the early
1970's with International Telephone and Telegraph. If a
court does engage in searching review--as District Judge
Harold Greene in our circuit did when he reviewed the
proposed AT&T consent decree in a meticulous 103-page
opinion--the court of necessity becomes both super-
legislature and super-agency, an unelected and unguided
guardian of the "public interest".
Legislative Veto
Unreviewed consent decrees present the risk that
the executive branch will unilaterally bind the government
as effectively as any piece of legislation; legislative veto
provisions raise the similar risk that the legislative
branch will unilaterally exercise executive or judicial
power or take legislative action without the required
presentation of legislation to the president.
The Supreme Court's holding in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha--that a provision authoriz-
ing one House of Congress to veto the attorney general's
suspension of an alien's deportation (sic)--was prefigured
by two decisions in our circuit that also held various
legislative veto provisions unconstitutional. These hold-
ings stand in sharp contrast to the unquestioned constitu-
tionality of acts in Britain providing that rules be laid
before one or both Houses of Parliament and that such rules
be annulled either automatically or by resolution. The dif-
ferent constitutional result in our countries stems from the
importance of the constitutionally prescribed separation of
powers principle in the United States.
The Chadha decision left open a number of ques-
tions. Because over 200 statutes contain legislative veto
provisions, one immediate question is whether these uncon-
stitutional provisions are severable or whether whole sta-
tutes must be invalidated. If a statute does not state that
unconstitutional sections are severable, there will inevita-
bly be a series of challenges to agency authority on the
theory that the nonseverable legislative veto clause invali-
dates the agency action. If the legislative veto clause is
severable, however, the remainder of the statute exists with
"no strings attached". Conceivably, there could now be an
excessive and therefore unconstitutional delegation of leg-
islative power. Even assuming that the severability problem
is satisfactorily resolved, one wonders what Congress can do
to reassert its authority over administrative agencies.
Before Chadha, Congress had been moving in the direction of
reducing agency discretion by providing for legislative veto
of overzealous agency action. With a similar goal, Sena-
tor Bumpers went so far as to propose de novo court review
of agency action. After Chadha, Congress is even more in-
clined to assert control, but what some thought its most
effective tool has been taken away. Some academics suggest
that Congress could mimic the legislative veto by condition-
ing the legal effect of a regulation on Congress's passage
of a confirmatory law (presented to the President) pursuant
to expedited internal rules. Although feasible, this ap-
proach would require Congress to reopen the uneasy compro-
mise reached over its internal procedures and devote much
more attention to proposed regulations. It remains to be
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seen whether Congress values the legislation veto suffi-
ciently to adopt this more costly surrogate.
Risk Assessment
Another question deserving the attention of Con-
gress, as well as the consideration of agencies and courts,
is how risks of various governmental acts should be assessed
and by whom. The nuclear industry presents this problem in
perhaps its most acute form.
Broadly written congressional enactments provided
the occasion for judicial activism in recent years. In
People Against Nuclear Energy, for example, the Supreme
Court reversed a panel of our court for requiring an en-
vironmental impact statement assessing the fears local
residents might have about the reopening of a nuclear power
plant. Likewise, in Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court twice
reversed our court for usurping the policymaking preroga-
tives reserved for the political branches of government.
Regulation of nuclear power, like selection of
energy sources in general, necessitates resolution of
complex issues far beyond the technical capacity of most
judges. Aside from the lack of facilities, lack of expert
staff, inadequate training, and institutional inability to
mandate public expenditures, judicial forays into delicately
woven regulatory schemes are episodic--they disrupt the
agency's attempt to manage its affairs in a coordinated
fashion.
Rather than arrogate policy decisions for itself,
the judiciary would be better advised to require agencies to
assess risk in an appropriate manner, assuming that risk
assessment is authorized by Congress. Commendably, the
executive branch has instituted its own regulatory analysis
review program pursuant to President Reagan's Executive
Order 12,261. Although the agency responsible for imple-
menting the program, the Office of Management and Budget,
can review only a small percentage of regulations, Harvard
Professor Richard Stewart reports that "[i]ts analysts have
often identified unnecessarily costly or clumsy elements in
proposed regulations and secured useful modifications in
them". 4/
Sound decision making suggests that agencies
consider total risk; that is, the sum of the risks manifest
at each stage of the process by which a service or good is
produced. By comparing nuclear energy to its real, avail-
able alternatives instead of some imaginary cheap, safe, and
inexhaustible energy source, even courts might conclude that
their penchant for remanding to agencies for further fact
finding has jeopardized America's energy security. I hasten
to add, however, that the most enlightened cost/benefit ana-
lysis must remain unavailing in many fields because Congress
has laid down an all-or-nothing approach. Accordingly,
agencies responsible for protecting the snail darter or ban-
ning carcinogens like saccharin must act oblivious to the
costs their regulations impose on the economy or the consum-
ing public.
VI. The Problem of Judicial Activism, or "The Seizure of
Abandoned Swords and Purses"
The problem of snail darters and carcinogens, how-
ever, is the exception and not the rule. In the last few
decades, Congress has deliberately passed the difficult de-
cisions to the judiciary far more often than it has legis-
lated an overly rigid rule. The most acute issue facing
reviewing courts today is what they should do when the two
political branches leave the task of policy making to the
unelected members of the judiciary.
By abdicating its duty to legislate public policy,
Congress makes the position of the judiciary untenable.
Without congressional guidance, how can a court tread the
line between deference to agency decision making and cor-
recting deviations from congressionally mandated policy?
The courts are supposed to do both. Where the line is drawn
will decide many a case, but line drawing is frequently
plain policy making.
By identifying the source of administrative law's
current affliction, we have also identified where lies its
cure. Reform of the administrative process is primarily the
4/ R. Stewart, The Limits of Administrative Law 19 (June
1983) (unpublished manuscript).
duty of Congress and the agencies. The ability of the
courts to reform the agencies is limited by the nature of
their review function only, and by statute (as we saw in
Vermont Yankee and People Against Nuclear Energy). More-
over, because courts can decide only "cases and contro-
versies" under our Constitution, judicial reform would be
piecemeal, costly, and slow in coming--even if it did not
violate statutory and constitutional norms.
The inability of courts to reform the administra-
tive process underscores the theme of this paper--the ne-
cessity of judicial restraint. Only by keeping within the
bounds set by the Framers, Congress, and our institutions
can judges keep faith with the oaths of their office and, by
refusing to exercise the prerogatives of Congress and execu-
tive, force them to live up to their constitutional obliga-
tions as well.
CORRECTION
I have just received the Spring '85 issue of the
Journal of the NAALJ, and noted on page 50 a reprint of the
Interim Report on Cases Heard by UI officers .
[T]he caseload for Missouri UI referees should be
4-5 per day, 21-25 per week. The discrepancy in the figures
published may be a result of double-counting of the caseload
for those referees who travel to hearings. For those
referees, they may very well hear up to eight cases in one
day, 42 per week, but they also would, in alternate weeks,
have a week with no cases at all, spent writing the deci-
sions. For those referees stationed at one location, cases
typically are heard one-half day and then written one-half
day, five cases per day, 25 per week, every week.
Robert W. Richards, Esq.
Kansas City, MO
April 23, 1985
